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Introduction 
 
 In October, 2006 Burnham et al. (2006), hereafter “L2”, announced its now-
famous sample-survey-based estimate of 601,000 violent deaths in Iraq occurring 
between March, 2003 and the middle of 2006.  Fourteen months later, the Iraq Family 
Health Study Group (2008a), hereafter “IFHS (2008a)”, published results of a different 
survey that estimated 151,000 violent deaths for virtually the identical time period as that 
of the L2 survey.  The two estimates are fundamentally incompatible with one another; 
for example, the bottom of L2’s 95% confidence interval is nearly twice the top of the 
IFHS (2008a) 95% confidence interval (426,000 versus 223,000).  Fifteen months later, 
and following a long investigation, the principal researcher of the L2 survey, was 
censured by the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) because 
he “repeatedly refused to make public essential facts about his research” (AAPOR, 
2009a).  At the time, Richard Kulka, AAPOR’s president, wrote: 
 
“When researchers draw important conclusions and make public statements and arguments based 
on survey research data, then subsequently refuse to answer even basic questions about how their 
research was conducted, this violates the fundamental standards of science, seriously undermines 
open public debate on critical issues, and undermines the credibility of all survey and public 
opinion research.” (AAPOR, 2009a) 
 
Shortly thereafter, Johns Hopkins University suspended L2’s principal researcher from 
being a principle investigator on any human subjects research for five years (Bloomberg 
School of Public Health, 2009)  after an unidentified body at the University determined 
that he had violated commitments made to the School’s Institutional Review Board to 
protect the confidentiality of the survey’s respondents.  There is now a substantial 
literature dissecting the shortcomings in the L2 survey, with contributions in peer-
reviewed journals including Daponte (2007), Johnson et al. (2008), Laaksonen (2008), 
Rosenblum and van der Laan (2009) and Spagat (2009a and 2010).  The authors of the 
L2 survey have made no substantive response to any of these works.1 
 A series of estimates by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) of “excess 
deaths” (defined below) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) rival L2 in their 
fame, particularly the Coughlan et al. (2006) estimate of 3.9 million excess deaths, 
subsequently raised to 5.4 million (Coughlan et al., 2008) between August 1998 and 
April 2007.2  Yet Human Security Report (2009) closely examines the IRC’s published 
data and concludes that the data themselves can only support an estimate of roughly 
860,000 excess deaths with a 95% confidence interval of -550,000 to 2.4 million between 
May 2001 and April 2007.3   Moreover, the re-estimate of Human Security Report (2009) 
                                                 
1 On two occasions inaccurate general responses to critics were posted, and then 
removed, from the web site of the Bloomberg School of Public Health of Johns Hopkins 
University (Spagat, 2009a).  
2 However, the journal version of this paper, Coughlan et al. (2009) contains no mention 
of excess deaths. 
3 The IRC does not give proper confidence intervals for either its 3.9 million estimate or 
for its 5.4 million estimate, instead offering vague ranges that substantially underplay the 
uncertainty surrounding their estimates. 
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treats the IRC data as accurate for the purpose of statistical reanalysis even though the 
IRC child mortality rate estimates are about twice as high as those of a different and 
credible survey (Macro International INC., 2009).   
Thus, over the last few years two high-profile failures of survey-based estimates 
of war deaths have shaken confidence in this methodology.4  Nevertheless, there have 
been some quieter successes.  In the present paper, I reexamine the sample-survey 
methodology for estimating war deaths and consider the future of the field.  Section 2 
gives a critical overview of this approach.  In section 3 I work through case studies from 
Kosovo, Darfur, the DRC and Iraq.  I draw some conclusions and look to the future in 
section 4.  
The present paper has a number of limitations due largely to space constraints.  
First, the only human cost I consider is death, leaving out such important costs as injury, 
displacement and rape.  The existing literature focuses strongly on death, perhaps because 
this is the most dramatic human cost of war.5  However, the conflict field should allocate 
more effort into measuring other human costs in the future.  Indeed, it is puzzling that 
there has been so little effort to measure injuries in particular in sample surveys.6  
Injuries could be relatively well measured and they are, arguably, more policy-releva
than deaths since injuries require ongoing treatment and other policy measures.  Secon
focus almost exclusively on the survey approach to measuring war deaths since this is an 
important topic which is already difficult to cover properly within a single chapter.  
However, a more complete survey of the field would have to include methodologies for 
measuring war deaths practiced in a number of other projects including those at Uppsala 
University, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Iraq Body Count, B’Tselem and 
the Benetech Initiative as well as demographic methods.
nt 
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2.  Survey sampling methodology applied to conflict 
 
Theory and sampling 
 
4 Indeed, survey approaches to measuring deaths due to economic sanctions in Iraq have 
encountered similar problems.  Zaidi (1997) withdrew her survey-based estimate of 
567,000 child deaths due to sanctions (Zaidi and Smith, 1995) after revisiting households 
from the original survey and failing to replicate many of the deaths.  According to a 
subsequent UNICEF survey, child mortality nearly doubled in the early 1990’s in Iraq 
(Ali and Shah, 2000 and Ali, Blacker and Jones, 2003), resulting in an estimated 400,000 
to 500,000 “excess deaths” of children.  However, Dyson (2009) shows that these 
estimates are inconsistent with a range of credible evidence and argues that it is likely 
that the UNICEF “survey data were deliberately manipulated by the then government of 
Iraq.” 
5 Pedersen (2009) gives a broad overview of the literature on health and conflict. 
6 Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2004 (2005b) measured war-related disabilities due to 
the recent Iraq war.  This concept is related to, but not identical with, injuries.  For 
example, some disabilities do not result from violent injuries and some violent injuries do 
not turn into chronic disabilities.   
7 Some of these approaches are covered in Asher et al. (2008), Brunborg et al. (2006), 
Hicks et al. (2008) and Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2010).  
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We could try to estimate the total number of people who have died in a conflict 
during a particular time period by carrying out a census of the entire conflict-affected 
population.  This approach requires conducting interviews at every household within the 
conflict-affected area in an attempt to record the fate of every single person.  However, 
conflict censuses are extremely expensive and will, consequently, always be rare.8 
An obvious money-saving alternative to a census is a sample survey which, in 
theory, should be able to underpin good estimates of conflict deaths as long as samples 
are sufficiently large and representative of a full conflict-affected population.  Samples 
may provide some further advantages relative to censuses.  For example, the smaller 
scope of a survey could make it possible to focus more on data quality than a census 
might be able to do, although in the final analysis this comparison would depend on how 
well funded the two approaches are relative to their scope. 
The idea behind the use of sampling to estimate war deaths is straightforward but 
worth a brief discussion in the interest of clarity.  Suppose, for example, that we draw a 
sample such that every household in the affected population has an equal probability of 
selection into the sample.9  Suppose, further, that for each household in our sample we 
manage to measure accurately both the number of living household members and the 
number of former household members who have died due to a war.10  If x% of the 
sample population are found to have died due to the war then x becomes an unbiased 
estimate for the percent of war deaths in the full war-affected population.  If we know the
size of this population then we can multiply by this number to obtain an unbiased 
estimate of the total number of war deaths in this population.  With additional details 
about the sample design we can also construct a confidence interval that quantifies the 
sampling (but not the non-sampling) error around this estimate.  Unfortunately, these 
steps are fraught with potential pitfalls even though they
 
 are simple and few. 
                                                
The quality of any survey depends crucially on how its sample is built yet it is 
often very challenging to draw a good sample.  Researchers will be lucky to have a 
reasonably complete list of the households comprising the population affected by a 
conflict.  Such a list may exist if, for example, there has been a recent census.  If so, then 
it will be possible to draw a simple random sample which can be conceived as follows.  
 
8 Moreover, even a national census might fail to measure conflict mortality adequately in 
cases where victims, and possibly perpetrators, of violence have been driven abroad.  In 
such cases good measurement requires access to these displaced populations.  Many 
attempts to measure conflict mortality will need to contend with such scattering of the 
affected population but the costs of administering a census are particularly sensitive to 
this problem. 
9 It is not necessary that every household have equal probability of being chosen.  We can 
construct valid estimates as long as each household has a known and non-zero probability 
of being chosen. 
10 Here we ignore all problems in defining households, although doing this is particularly 
tricky and problematic in a conflict environment.  There are births, deaths, in-migration, 
out-migration, cases of multiple families sharing single segmented dwellings, household 
mergers and splits, forced migration and other phenomena that complicate definitions of 
households. 
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Assign a number to every household in the affected population.  Write each number on 
otherwise identical balls and place them in a huge urn.  Draw balls at random and do 
interviews with the households that correspond to these balls.  
A big problem with simple random sampling, even when it is feasible, is that it 
can be prohibitively expensive to conduct interviews at all of the households selected 
with this method.  The conflict-affected population may be dispersed over a large 
territory.  In this case, interviewing all households in a simple random sample might 
require field teams to travel great distances, perhaps hundreds of miles over rough terrain 
just to perform one interview.  A common cost-cutting response to this logistical problem 
is to interview clusters of nearby households.  Concentrating interviews close together 
reduces travel time and other expenses.11  This is the main practical reason why cluster 
sampling is widely used in conflict mortality survey research. 
The use of cluster sampling rather than simple random sampling will normally 
widen confidence intervals because households located close to one another are likely to 
have similar conflict mortality experiences.  This effect can be quite large in small cluster 
surveys since a few unrepresentative clusters in a survey with a small number of clusters 
can give a very misleading estimate (Spagat 2009b).  Nevertheless, comparing a cluster 
sample to a simple random sample with the same number of households can itself be 
misleading, since it will not in general be feasible to switch from the former to the latter 
on a fixed budget.  From the economic point of view, cluster sampling, by enabling a 
larger sample size on a fixed budget, may well outperform simple random sampling.   
A serious issue remains over how to select a sample when there is not a 
reasonably reliable enumeration of households in the affected population.  A variety of 
techniques have been used to tackle this problem.  Briefly, the key step in these methods 
is to somehow carve up a geographical space into manageable units such as towns, 
villages or city neighborhoods.  Next, population estimates for these units are used to 
select some of them with probability proportional to these population estimates.  Of 
course, sample quality will depend very much on the quality of these population 
estimates.  At this stage at least two broad lines are followed.  The first, more careful, 
technique is to fully enumerate households within the chosen units.  Although making 
such listings takes time, this procedure is still considerably cheaper than enumerating all 
households within the full affected population, i.e., essentially conducting a census.  
Households are then selected randomly for interviews from these specially-created 
within-cluster household lists, often with the use of simple random sampling.  The second 
class of approaches, considerably cheaper than the first but far less accurate, usually 
involves some kind of directional sampling.  For example, teams begin from some central 
point in the geographical space, spin a pen, select a first household at random along the 
direction the pen points and continue conducting further interviews at other households 
that are near to the first one (Grais et al. 2007).12  A serious problem with such 
                                                 
11 A second potential advantage of cluster samples relative to simple random samples is 
that by reducing travel time, cluster samples reduce exposure of interview teams to risk.  
This can be important since conflict surveys are often conducted in relatively dangerous 
environments in which travel entails risk. 
12 Johnson et al. (2008) argues that the directional sampling procedure used in Burnham 
et al. (2006) may have introduced a substantial upward bias. 
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procedures is that they do not normally determine households to be interviewed 
unambiguously, thus allowing subjective judgments of interview teams to express 
themselves.  For example, in an urban environment it will often be impossible to travel 
very far in a direction selected by a pen spin so it will be necessary to change course and 
it is unclear how this should be done.  Proximity is rarely, if ever, defined in write-ups of 
surveys, although various definitions are possible.  Lack of clear guidance can allow field 
teams to use their own discretion in moving from house to house, undermining the 
random selection of households.  In general, little is known about the properties of 
directional sampling, making these a very important topic for future research. 
Another crucial issue is the relationship between the population group actually 
covered by surveys and to the full conflict-affected population that is of interest to 
researchers and the general public.  Some conflict mortality surveys are conducted 
exclusively, or largely, within special settlements of displaced people.  Sometimes, 
particularly when surveys are conducted during a conflict, some parts of affected 
populations cannot be safely accessed.  In such cases the population actually covered by a 
survey is only a sub-group of the full conflict-affected population that we are interested in 
and we cannot know how representative the former is of the latter.  Populations displaced 
by a conflict will, almost by definition, have suffered some conflict exposure, thus 
suggesting that their mortality rates might be above-average relative to the full conflict-
affected population.  On the other hand, displaced people have managed to reach a camp, 
possibly because they have access to greater-than average resources or faced lower-than-
average risks compared to people who died.  Thus, presence in a camp may actually be 
correlated with lower-than-average mortality rates.  In fact, there are so many potential  
biases present in groups of displaced people that there is generally no way to know how 
representative a displaced population might be of a broader conflict-affected population.  
This means that extrapolations from sub-samples of displaced people are dangerous and 
should not be attempted.13  Similarly, while it may be tempting to assume that areas that 
are currently inaccessible to survey-research teams have experienced more violence in 
the past than currently-accessible areas, this assumption might not actually be true.  For 
example, an armed group may have established dominance in an area in the recent past 
and currently be able to offer secure access for researchers.  But the area might have 
experienced very high mortality while this armed group was establishing its control in the 
first place (Kalyvas, 2006).  The reverse can also be true.  An area that is presently 
contested, and thus inaccessible to survey teams, might have been relatively safe in the 
recent past.  Once again, projecting results from surveyed areas onto areas that have not 
been surveyed can be misleading.  
 
What is measured 
 
Three broad classes of war-death-related estimates have been published in the 
literature: violent deaths, mortality rates and excess deaths (which are based on mortality 
rates).  Violent deaths are usually assumed to be war-related, although some violent 
                                                 
13 General Accounting Office (2006) examines widely discrepant estimates of war deaths 
in Darfur and argues that many of these divergences probably result from improper 
extrapolations that have been made from displaced populations onto general populations. 
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deaths probably would have occurred even without war.  Sometimes estimates are 
presented simply of mortality rates.  These are expressed in a variety of units such as 
deaths per 10,000 per day or deaths per 1,000 per year.  The excess-deaths concept is 
meant to measure deaths, both violent and non-violent, that would not have occurred if a 
conflict had not occurred.  This means that the excess-deaths concept is, fundamentally, 
based on a counterfactual analysis, making all excess-death estimates rather speculative 
in nature.  The key to any excess-death estimate is to establish a plausible baseline 
mortality rate to serve as a counterfactual.  In practice, these have been taken to be either 
a regional average or else a pre-war mortality rate has been projected forward as an 
assumed rate that would have prevailed in the absence of war.  Neither assumption is 
very plausible.  Many countries will tend to be systematically either above or below 
average for their regions independent of whether or not they suffer a war.  Moreover, 
there is no reason to assume, as is implicit in the excess-deaths concept that all changes in 
mortality rates that coincide with a war are specifically caused by the war.  For example, 
a drought may cause a war while directly causing much of an increase in mortality 
accompanying the drought/war.  In this case it would be highly misleading to treat the 
war as the sole cause of the increase in mortality as typical excess-deaths calculations 
would do. Consequently, Human Security Report (2009) argues that the foundations of 
excess-death calculations are so weak that they should be abandoned, except possibly in a 




 An evaluation of the details of how survey data are gathered in the field is the 
other key ingredient for understanding the quality of a survey.  This dictum applies in 
particular to conflict surveys, since they are frequently conducted within highly charged 
political environments and are inextricably intertwined with the assignment of blame for 
violence and atrocities.  Members of a particular religious, ethnic, social or class group 
may wish to pin blame for killings on a rival group and such motivations can affect 
behavior of both interviewers and interviewees alike.  At one extreme either interviewers 
or interviewees might simply invent deaths that have not occurred.15  Or blame for real 
deaths may be shifted by either party from a group that was actually responsible, or from 
an unknown group, to a different one.  Some surveys reduce the above motivation for 
information distortion by not asking interviewees to affix group blame for violent 
deaths.16     
Both interviewees and interviewers may treat a survey as a tool to attract 
international aid or to encourage the intervention or withdrawal of international powers 
from the conflict zone (General Accounting Office, 2006, p. 15).  Depending on the 
situation, such motivations could lead to either under or over-estimation of the number 
                                                 
14 Asher (2009) gives a good treatment of field work issues in conflict surveys. 
15 Spagat (2010) presents evidence of fabricated deaths in the Burnham et al. (2006) 
survey. 
16 For example, the questions recommended by SMART Methodology Version 1 (2006) 
for determining causes of war-related deaths will not determine the group membership of 
perpetrators (p. 78). 
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dead and to other distortions in survey findings.  Interviewees or interviewers may 
perceive that a large estimate of deaths is necessary to claim the attention of a jaded and 
distracted international community, to focus opprobrium on parties to a conflict or to 
attract aid or reparations.  Alternatively, interviewees or interviewers may think that low 
mortality numbers might help to avoid external intervention or to maintain an ongoing 
intervention that could be viewed internationally as having a positive effect if current 
deaths rates are low.  Indeed, the write-ups of many conflict mortality studies contain 
pleas for interventions or criticism for the absence of past intervention.  Such advocacy 
may be appropriate but, simultaneously, highlights the need for careful scrutiny of the 
quality of data collection efforts and how these might relate to outcomes desired by 
survey participants.  
More mundane concerns, common to all survey research, also apply with 
particular strength to conflict surveys.  Interviewees might not follow proper procedures 
for a variety of reasons.  One extreme behavior is to simply make up answers to survey 
questionnaires without actually doing the interviews (AAPOR and ASA, 2003).  Such 
cheating can sometimes be detected by inspection of completed questionnaires and 
computer programs can also be used to detect patterns suggestive of fabrication (Bredl, 
Winker and Kötschau, 2008).  Interviewers may also cheat in more subtle ways, for 
example, doing interviews in a more convenient location than a remote location selected 
by sampling procedures.  Or interviewers may simply get careless at the end of a long 
day if they are under pressure to do many interviews very quickly.  The motivation to cut 
corners can be especially strong in conflict surveys where field work is likely to be 
physically strenuous and possibly dangerous.  Thus, it is particularly important in conflict 
research to implement a solid system of quality checks.  These can include comparing 
results turned in by different interviewers and field teams with each other, contact of a 
sample of households who are supposed to have been interviewed to make sure they were 
actually interviewed and re-interviews of a random sample of households by a second 
team to check on the quality of the first team’s work (AAPOR and ASA, 2003).  It is 
important that field teams know in advance that they will be subjected to such scrutiny so 
that they are on their best behavior from the very beginning. 
The backgrounds of interview teams and how these relate to those of the 
interviewees also need to be considered.  If interviewers are readily linked to one side in 
a conflict then interviewees might tune their responses accordingly.  Another issue is that 
local culture might preclude candid interviews of males by females and vice versa.   
Interviewees might not be politically motivated but may struggle to remember 
information accurately or may under report unpleasant information.  For example, some 
analysts think that that interviewees tend to underreport deaths of small children (Sullivan 
et al., 2000) although Hill and Choi (2006) find little evidence to support this view.  
People might remember real deaths but shift the timing of these deaths unintentionally.  
Timing inaccuracies can be important for a survey if, for example, pre-war deaths are 
reported as post-war deaths inflating the death count attributed to a war.  Since memory 
fades with time, surveys covering long time periods will be less accurate than comparable 
surveys covering short time periods.  Household composition may also be rendered 
increasingly inaccurately as recall periods are extended.  Extended family members might 
circulate through a household at various points in time, especially in families that have 
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experienced displacement.  Mortality rates could be exaggerated if deaths of temporary 
household members are treated as deaths of permanent household members. 
   
  




 Spiegel and Salama (2000) used a cluster survey with 50 clusters and 24 
households per cluster to estimate 12,000 deaths due to “war-related trauma” with a 95% 
confidence interval of 5,500 to 18,300 for the war in Kosovo between February, 1998 and 
June, 1999.  Researchers worked from a 1991 census, adjusted using updating 
information from various sources, to randomly select 50 villages or neighborhoods.  
Although they were not able to include villages with populations below 100 the survey 
does seem, nevertheless, to have managed rather good coverage of the affected 
population.  Field teams started from the center of each unit, selected a random direction 
by an unspecified method and proceeded to the edge of the unit, recording either the 
distance to the edge or the number of housing units along the way.  They then chose a 
random household along this radius for their first interview in the cluster and moved to 
the right from nearest household to nearest household until they completed 24 interviews.  
There are some ambiguities in the description of the sampling procedures.  The 
description seems to assume discrete houses so it is unclear how apartment buildings 
were handled.  Also it is unclear how the center of each unit was defined and exactly 
what it means to select a random direction from the center.  For example, in an urban 
environment the street layout may allow only two or four feasible directions of 
movement out of the center.  There could be many areas unreachable to the survey 
depending on how this ambiguity is resolved.  If mortality in the unreachable areas 
differs significantly form mortality in the reachable areas then the sample could be 
biased.  For example, it is possible that ethic cleansing campaigns perpetrated by the 
Yugoslav government penetrated less deeply into relatively inaccessible areas than into 
accessible ones.  On the other hand, it seems much less likely the NATO aerial 
bombardment campaign would have followed such a pattern. 
The authors give little information on field work other than that it was done by 14 
field teams each consisting of 2 Albanian speakers.  It is possible that some Albanian 
interviewees or Albanian-speaking interviewers may have wanted to exaggerate the 
number of deaths to call attention to the victimization of their group.  Such incentives 
would have been weakened, but not eliminated, by the fact that interviewees were not 
asked to identify perpetrators of violent deaths, thus denying them a direct opportunity to 
blame Serbs for their relatives’ deaths.  The authors do not describe any quality-control 
procedures such as comparing interview results across teams, checks by supervisors that 
interviews were done or re-interviews to make sure interviews were done properly.  The 
recall period was 17 months which seems to be quite reasonable.17       
                                                 
17 SMART Methodology Version I (2006) states categorically that recall periods longer 
than a year should not be used, but this would appear to be an inordinately conservative 
rule.  
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A notable and unexpected finding of the study is extremely high war-related death 
rates for males above 50 years old, who are estimated to have been killed at more than 
three times the rate for military-aged males.  If true, this suggests that older men may 




Depoortere et al. (2004) did cluster surveys at four sites within West Darfur that 
included internally displaced people (IDPs).  The surveys measured mortality of 
households both at the sites and, for three of the four, before arrival to the sites.  Some 
people at these sites were living within special camps for the displaced while in other 
areas displaced people were mixed in with the permanent population.  Researchers did 30 
clusters of 30 households at three sites while in the fourth, with limited time, they did 30 
clusters of 15 households.  The authors follow good practice in not extrapolating their 
results to the full affected population of West Darfur or all of Darfur.  Their sub-
population of IDPs is of valid interest by itself. 
Sampling procedures were similar to those in Spiegel and Salama (2000).  
Relatively small slices of territory were chosen.  In each one a field team walked from the 
center to the edge in a random direction selected by an unspecified method, enumerating 
all the households in between.  They then selected one household at random and did 
interviews at that one and 29 (or 14) further proximate households.  An apparent 
weakness is that “proximity” is left undefined in the paper, opening the possibility that 
interview teams may have had discretion in their house-to-house movements.  Well-
specified sampling procedures rule out such discretion so that interviewers are not free to 
gravitate, consciously or unconsciously, in directions that might look like they will yield 
results the interviewers would favor. 
The description of the sampling methods does not strongly suggest that there were 
unreachable parts of surveyed areas.  It is, however, likely that locations close to cluster 
centers had higher selection chances than areas at the edges.18  Imagine a field team 
setting out from the center of a roughly circular camp.  There is a much narrower range of 
random directions that will lead the team to pass, and hence list, a household located near 
the edge of the camp than is required for the team to pass and list a household near to the 
center.  Thus, this sampling scheme can introduce bias if mortality rates near camp 
centers differ systematically from rates at the edges.  Suppose, for example, that camps 
are formed by successive waves of displaced people where the first wave defines the 
center and later waves extend the camp outwards more or less in concentric circles.  
Mortality may differ systematically between these waves, although there is no reason to 
expect that the mortality rates of later waves should be either higher or lower than earlier 
ones.  Indeed, an interesting finding of Depoortere et al. (2004) is that mortality 
experiences of neighboring families within camps, even pre-arrival, tend to be very 
similar.  This suggests that spatial patterns of mortality with IDP camps could be quite 
complex and subtle, implying that the details of sampling schemes can be crucial in 
determining results. 
                                                 
18 SMART Methodology Version 1 (2006) makes this point on page 56. 
 9
An undisclosed number of interviewers, described as “local, highly literate”, 
accompanied by Arabic-speaking translators of unspecified backgrounds conducted the 
interviews.  It is unclear how these interview teams would relate to the interviewees.  As 
the interviewees were current and prospective recipients of international aid they might 
have perceived that they had an interest in exaggerating their mortality experiences and 
interviewers might have shared the goal of attracting international action.  The main 
quality check on the field work appears to be that filled-out questionnaires were checked 
for accuracy each day.  Recall periods were very short and conservative, ranging between 
39 and 193 days.     
During the pre-arrival periods the central estimates for the crude mortality rates 
were in a range of 5.9 to 9.5 per 10,000 people per day with upper and lower limits for 
95% confidence intervals between 2.2 and 15.7 per 10,000 per day.  All these numbers 
far exceed a common emergency threshold of 1 per 10,000 per day.  Even within-camp 
crude mortality rates tend to exceed this threshold, in one site by at least a factor of four.  
In short, Depoortere et al. (2004) left little doubt that there was a humanitarian crisis in 
Darfur.  A further result is that although most people violently killed were estimated to be 
adult males, significant numbers of women and children were also killed.  
There is great public interest in numbers for violent or excess deaths for the 
Darfur conflict.  However, there are no surveys with proper random coverage of all of 
Darfur at any time during the conflict and no obvious mortality rate to use as a baseline in 
an excess-deaths calculation.  Nevertheless, a supply of Darfur estimates has arisen to 
satisfy the demand for a single number to sum up the human cost of the war.  GAO 
(2006) evaluates six such disparate attempts that cover different time periods and propose 
figures ranging from 63,000 excess deaths to 400,000 total deaths.  Hagan and Palloni 
(2006) and Degomme and Guha-Sapir (2010) made subsequent estimates, still in the 
absence of a proper random sample or a clear baseline.  Despite these problems 
Degomme and Sapir (2010) do usefully bring to bear evidence from 63 local surveys and 
shows rather convincingly that mortality rates have dropped strongly between 2004 and 
2008 with violence rates decreasing much more quickly than diarrhea-related mortality. 
 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
 
Beginning in 2000 the International Rescue Committee (IRC) has released a 
series of five estimates of excess deaths in the DRC covering longer and longer periods: 
1.7, 2.5, 3.3, 3.9 and 5.4 million excess deaths have been estimated with the last figure 
covering August 1998 to April 2007.19  Human Security Report (2009), hereafter “HSR”, 
examines these estimates in great detail and comes to two main conclusions.  First, the 
IRC’s central estimates are too high by a very wide margin.  Second, carefully calculated 
confidence intervals are so wide that the IRC’s central estimates are not very meaningful.  
In this section I mainly summarize the analysis of HSR and then take a closer look at 
Coghlan et al. (2006) since this work illustrates in microcosm some of the main problems 
with the IRC estimates and was the only study in the series that was published in a well-
known peer-reviewed journal. 
                                                 
19 These numbers come from, respectively, Roberts (2000), Roberts et al. (2001), Roberts 
et al. (2003), Coghlan et al. (2006) and Coghlan et al. (2008). 
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Roberts (2000) and Roberts et al. (2001), the first two studies in the IRC series, 
produce estimates based on eleven separate sample surveys of eight areas of the DRC that 
are non-randomly selected and very small.  Because of the non-random selection 
mechanism these surveys are not appropriate for extrapolation to estimates of excess 
deaths for all of the eastern DRC.  Yet the IRC does this anyway with its estimates of 1.7 
and 2.5 million excess deaths.20  HSR argues, correctly, that these estimates should be 
disregarded and that the IRC data are not usable for region-wide estimates for the period 
August 1998 to March 2001.21   
For the period between May 2001 and April 2007 the IRC surveys do have 
reasonable national coverage and are, therefore, usable to estimate national mortality 
rates.  The IRC pushes one step further by estimating excess mortality.  As noted above, 
this requires specifying a hypothetical baseline mortality rate and assuming that the DRC 
would have experienced this rate if there had not been a war.  The IRC assumes, 
implausibly, that without war the DRC would have experienced the average mortality 
rate for all of Sub-Saharan Africa: 1.5 per 1,000 per month.22  This is not credible 
because decades of misrule by the government of Mobutu Sese Seko, rendered it very 
unlikely that the DRC could have achieved the mainstream mortality rate for all of Sub-
Saharan Africa.  Of course, one cannot know an appropriate counterfactual mortality rate.  
This is the main reason why the excess-deaths concept is problematic in the first place.  
However, for the sake of argument, HSR proposes a baseline of 2.0 per 1,000 per month, 
which is what the IRC itself measures in western DRC.  This region was largely 
untouched by the war and is, therefore, a plausible candidate to represent what the east 
might have experienced without war.  The mortality rates measured in the three surveys 
with national coverage conducted by the IRC turn out to be rather close to this alternative 
baseline.  Consequently making this reasonable change to the baseline mortality rate 
reduces the excess-death estimate from 2.8 million to 900,000, i.e., by more than a factor 
of three.   
The IRC has never published a proper confidence interval for its excess-death 
estimates.23  It does, however, give confidence intervals on its mortality-rate estimates 
which make it possible to construct confidence intervals for excess-death estimates.  HSR 
does these calculations and finds that, if you accept the IRC’s proposed baseline as an 
absolute certainty, the 95% confidence interval on excess deaths becomes 1.3 million to 
4.5 million.  If, instead, you accept the HSR’s proposed baseline then the 95% confidence 
interval becomes -550,000 to 2.4 million, meaning that the IRC data is not even robust 
                                                 
20 Note that the IRC does exactly what Depoortere et al. (2004) properly refrains from 
doing: extrapolate from surveys of non-randomly chosen areas to a region-wide estimate. 
21 Human Security Report (2009) also shows that even if one does assume, contrary to the 
reality, that the five areas in Roberts (2000) were randomly chosen a correct estimate 
would still be only about half of the IRC one.  The Roberts (2000) estimate is inflated by 
giving disproportionate weight to a tiny area with an exceptionally high death rate. 
22 The IRC lowers this baseline several years later to 1.4 per 1,000 per month in Coghlan 
et al. (2008). 
23 The IRC does offer some restricted ranges based on running a few scenarios under 
varying assumptions but never shows real confidence intervals calculated in a standard 
way. 
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enough to reject a hypothesis of negative excess deaths at a standard significance level.  
Assuming a probability distribution running between the IRC and HSR baselines would, 
of course, produce an even wider confidence interval than either of the above ones.  
Moreover, at best these confidence intervals incorporate only sampling error while non-
sampling errors are likely to be large as well.24  In short, the IRC estimates are so 
imprecise that they have little meaning. 
The problems with DRC excess mortality baselines and confidences intervals are 
clearly illustrated in microcosm by Coghlan et al. (2006). The estimate for the national 
crude mortality rate during the period January 2003 through April 2004 is 2.1 per 1000 
per month with a 95% confidence interval of 1.6 to 2.6.  Under the IRC’s baseline 
assumption this calculation gives an excess death rate estimate of (2.1 – 1.5) = 0.6 per 
1000 per month for a 15-month period.  Applying this rate to the IRC’s population 
estimate of 63.7 million gives (0.6 excess deaths per 1,000 per month) x (15 months) x 
(63,700,000 people)/(1,000) = 573,300 excess deaths which rounds up to 600,000.25  
Continuing to treat the baseline as completely certain but incorporating the IRC’s 95% 
confidence interval over the mortality rate of 1.6-2.6, the 95% confidence interval on this 
estimate becomes 100,000 to 1.1 million.  If we replace the IRC baseline with the HSR 
baseline then the central estimate becomes 100,000 with a 95% confidence interval of  
-400,000 to 600.000.   Thus, changing the baseline rate in a plausible way reduces the 
IRC’s central estimate by a factor of 6.  Moreover, note that the ranges on these 
confidence intervals are very large compared to the central estimates themselves and that 
it is not possible to rule out that excess deaths have been negative. 
Note further, that all the above analyses accept the IRC mortality rate estimates as 
given.  However, these may well be too high.  The IRC child mortality estimates are, in 
fact, roughly twice as high as those measured by a Demographic and Health (DHS) 
survey (Macro International Inc., 2007) which are generally regarded to be very high-





There have been five prominent survey estimates of violent deaths or excess 
deaths in the ongoing Iraq conflict.  These come from Roberts et al. (2004), hereafter 
“L1”, the Iraq Living Conditions Survey (ILCS, 2005), Burnham et al. (2006) (L2), IFHS 
(2008a) and the estimate of the polling firm Opinion Research Business (ORB, 2008).  
As noted above, the violent-death estimates of L2 and the IFHS fundamentally conflict 
with one another, with the bottom of L2’s 95% confidence interval nearly twice the top of 
the IFHS 95% confidence interval.  This is a simple comparison because the L2 and IFHS 
surveys cover virtually the same time periods.  Comparisons are more difficult for 
surveys covering different time periods because violent-death rates vary substantially 
                                                 
24 Important non-sampling errors include uncertainty over the baseline mortality rate 
itself, inaccuracies in establishing household boundaries and misunderstood questions 
perhaps due to translation issues.  
25 This calculation ignores, as the IRC does, the fact that 8% of the population was 
inaccessible to the survey. 
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over time.  Therefore, to facilitate such comparisons we incorporate the other widely 
quoted source on violent deaths in the Iraq war: Iraq Body Count (IBC).  IBC records 
civilian deaths based on monitoring a large number of sources including the media, 
hospitals, morgues, NGO’s and governments (Hicks et al., 2008).  IBC data are readily 
comparable to those from any of the five surveys because IBC data is daily, covers the 
entire conflict and is compiled using a uniform methodology.  
Table 1, taken from Spagat and Dougherty (2010), compares the five surveys 
along various dimensions, with IBC units serving as a measuring rod in some of the rows.  
The huge discrepancies in violent-death estimates apparent in the table has to call into 
question the validity of the survey approach for measuring violent conflict deaths.  At 
least some of these surveys have to be wrong by wide margins.  To maintain confidence 
in the survey approach to estimating violent conflict deaths we need to explain which of 
these surveys are wrong and why this is the case.  Otherwise, it will be impossible to 




Table 1. Five Surveys of Violent Deaths in Iraq since March 2003 
 
 ILCS L1 IFHS* L2 ORB 
Coverage 
Period Ends 












26,000 56,700 98,000 or 
151,000 
601,000 1,033,000 









Ratio to IBC 
in Baghdad 
1.0 1.9 – 2.7 1.9 or 2.9 5.2 12.5 
Number of 
clusters 




Yes No Yes No No 
Household 
Roster Taken 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
Source: Spagat and Dougherty (2010) 
*The IFHS argued that there is a general tendency for the underreporting of deaths in household surveys. 
On these grounds, the IFHS adjusted its estimate upwards by more than 50%, whereas all the other surveys 
in this table used conventional estimatation methods without such an adjustment. It is, therefore, best to 
remove this adjustment when comparing across surveys so in the IFHS column I always provide two 




Based on national estimates, the five surveys separate naturally into two groups.  
On the one hand, there are the ILCS, L1 and the IFHS with estimates roughly two to 
three times IBC figures for comparable time periods.26  On the other hand, the L2 and 
ORB estimates both exceed IBC figures by more than a factor of 12.   Focusing only on 
Baghdad the L2-ORB grouping largely breaks down while the ILCS-L1-IFHS grouping 
holds up fairly well.  The bottom three rows of Table 1 highlight a few quality indicators 
suggesting that the ILCS-L1-IFHS estimates are likely to be much closer to the truth than 
are the L2-ORB ones.  L1, L2 and, to a lesser extent ORB, all have a small number of 
clusters and are, therefore, vulnerable to drawing unrepresentative samples that include 
too many high-violence clusters (Spagat, 2009b).  The ILCS and IFHS are much larger 
surveys that do not have this weakness.  Moreover, the ILCS and IFHS are the most open 
about their methodologies.  This is exemplified in Table 1 by the simple fact that, alone, 
the ILCS and the IHFS meet the extremely minimal standard of disclosing their 
questionnaires.  In recent years there have been attempts within the survey profession to 
establish standards for disclosure of essential methodological information (AAPOR, 
2006).  In fact, the lead author of the L2 survey, was found to be in such serious breech of 
these standards that he was formally censured by the American Association for Public 
Opinion Research, one of only three formal censures applied over a 12-year period.27  
ORB also refuses to disclose its questions as asked in the field, although ORB has at least 
released an English version of these questions.  Finally, the table focuses on one aspect of 
methodological weakness of L2 and ORB relative to the other surveys: a failure to 
compile a list of all members of each household in the sample (a household roster) 
together with some basic demographic information on each household member.28  Not 
taking household rosters is generally viewed as bad practice (e.g., SMART Methodology, 
2006, p. 75).   
 Further analysis of the L2 and ORB estimates reinforces the view that these are 
out of line with reality.  Spagat and Dougherty (2010) focus on the ORB poll.  A key 
finding is that collation of ORB data ranging across three separate polls, including the 
one underpinning ORB’s violent-death estimate, reveals critical inconsistencies 
suggestive of compromised data collection.  More than 80% of ORB’s estimated deaths 
come from just four contiguous governorates of Iraq.  Within these governorates a greater 
percentage of respondents report deaths of household members than report deaths of 
extended-family members in a separate ORB poll taken only six months earlier.  This is 
not a credible pattern since extended-family networks reach far beyond household 
boundaries.  Respondents in the southern governorates of Iraq do, in fact, display the 
expected pattern of far fewer deaths of household members than deaths of extended-
family members.  But, incredibly, the center moves in the opposite direction and accounts 
for the vast majority of ORB’s estimate.  Spagat and Dougherty (2010) argue further that 
there are many key quality shortcomings in the ORB poll such as ambiguous questions 
                                                 
26 Part of the differences between IBC and the surveys comes from the fact that IBC 
counts only civilian deaths whereas the surveys include both civilians and combatants. 
27 AAPOR (2009b) lists the methodological details that the principal researcher on L2 has 
refused to disclose. 
28 Spagat (2010) includes evaluations of the methodological quality of the ILCS, IHFS 
and L2 and Spagat and Dougherty (2010) evaluates the quality of the ORB survey. 
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that are inadequate to prevent respondents from reporting non-violent deaths or deaths of 
extended family members, an unsound treatment of non-response and incorrect 
calculation of confidence intervals.  In short, the evidence suggests that the ORB estimate 
is very unreliable and far too high. 
 The departure of the L2 survey from the broad body of evidence on violent deaths 
in Iraq goes well beyond the comparisons presented in Table 1.  Here I highlight just two 
illustrative examples on the temporal and spatial patterns of violent deaths.29  For the 
period June 2005-June 2006 the violent-death rate measured by L2 exceeds that of the 
IFHS by more than a factor of seven with the bottom of L2’s 95% confidence interval 
nearly triple the top of the IFHS one (IFHS, 2008a).  The L2 estimate in five central 
governorates of Iraq exceeds the ILCS one by a factor of nearly twelve and even exceeds 
the top of the ILCS 95% confidence interval by a factor of 7.5 (Spagat, 2010).   
 There have been various attempts in the literature to explain the errors in the L2 
survey.  Rosenblum and van der Laan (2009) note that violence levels vary strongly 
across clusters in the L2 sample and that the sample size is small.  These factors imply 
that the sample distribution of violence by cluster could diverge strongly from the 
underlying distribution from which the data are drawn.  They argue that under these 
circumstances it is inappropriate to calculate confidence intervals either by assuming a 
normal distribution or through Monte Carlo methods.  They propose an alternative 
method for calculating confidence intervals in such environments that allows for 
divergence between underlying patterns generating the data and patterns apparent only in 
sample data.  They apply this technique to recalculations of confidence intervals for the 
L2 data, all of which come out much wider than the published confidence interval of 
Burnham et al. (2006); one even extends below 100,000.  In a similar spirit, Spagat 
(2009b) performs simulations using ILCS data, suggesting that small cluster surveys like 
the L2 one are unreliable and can easily overestimate violent deaths by a factor of three 
or more if they select a few unusually violent clusters.  Johnson et al. (2008) and Onnela 
et al. (2009) argue that the final-stage sampling methods used in L2 are biased towards 
violent areas and that this bias could cause great overestimation, even by a factor of three 
for plausible parameter values in the model.  Spagat (2010) provides evidence of data 
fabrication and falsification in the L2 survey that could account for the strong 
discrepancies between the L2 estimate and other evidence.30 
 Thus, close examination of both the ORB and L2 surveys provides ample reason 
to discard both of these estimates.  The remaining three surveys are broadly consistent 
with one another (Table 1).  However, the L1 estimate is extremely imprecise due to its 
very small number of clusters and, hence, this survey should receive little weight.31  
Thus, we are left, essentially, with the ILCS and the IFHS.   
Available documentation (ILCS, 2005, IFHS, 2008a, IFHS, 2008b) suggests that 
the data were carefully gathered for both the ILCS and IFHS surveys.  The quality of the 
ILCS field work benefited from the fact that its field work was carried out during a 
                                                 
29 More details can be found, e.g., in Spagat (2009a) and Spagat (2010). 
30 See the conclusion of Spagat (2010) for a concise summary of this evidence. 
31 Roberts et al. (2004) gave a confidence interval of 8,000 to 192,000 excess deaths for 
the country excluding one governorate and does not give a confidence interval for any 
estimate with this governorate included.   
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relatively peaceful time in Iraq.  On the other hand, a weakness of the ILCS for war-death 
estimation is that the follow-up cause-of-death question for respondents reporting deaths 
is not ideal, because it forces a choice between “disease”, “traffic accident”, “war-
related”, “during pregnancy, childbirth or within 40 days after”, “other (specify)” or 
“don’t know”.  There would appear to be a close correspondence between war-related 
deaths and violent deaths but it would be better if these were pinned down more clearly in 
the ILCS questionnaire. 
A clear problem with the IFHS is that, due to security reasons, the field teams 
failed to visit 115 out of 1086 selected clusters.  In particular, the teams visited just 37 
clusters in 108 attempts in Anbar, 65 out of 96 in Baghdad, 60 out of 72 in Nineveh and 
53 out of 54 in Wassit.  IFHS (2008a) adjusts for missed cluster visits only in Baghdad 
and Anbar and gives no reason why it did not attempt an adjustment in Nineveh.  For the 
Baghdad adjustment IFHS (2008a) assumes that the ratio of IFHS figures to IBC ones in 
Baghdad should be the same as the IFHS/IBC ratio in six high-mortality governorates.  
IFHS (2008a) implements this assumption by imputing to the missing Baghdad clusters 
the violence levels necessary to bring the IFHS/IBC ratio in Baghdad into equality with 
the IFHS/IBC ratio in the six high-mortality governorates.32  The implications of this 
assumption turn out to be strong, since equating these two ratios requires assuming that 
the missed clusters in Baghdad are four times as violent as the visited ones over the entire 
period of 3.3 years covered by the IFHS estimate.  This is a very strong assumption since 
it is based only on an observation (inability to visit a cluster) taken at a single point in 
time.  The impact is to add 30,000 violent deaths to the final IFHS estimate beyond what 
it would be if the missing clusters were equally violent as the visited ones.  Implicit in 
this adjustment is an assumption that the percent of violence covered by IBC is the same 
in Baghdad as it is in the six high-mortality governorates.  Thus, this upward adjustment 
would be too large to the extent that IBC’s coverage in Baghdad is actually better than its 
coverage elsewhere.33  When the IFHS dataset is released it will become possible to 
reevaluate this missing-cluster adjustment using district-level IBC information together 
with the breakdown of missing clusters by district in the IFHS.  Pending this reanalysis, 
the IFHS Baghdad adjustment should be regarded with some skepticism. 
Another issue concerning the IFHS estimate is that it is the only survey-based 
estimate of conflict deaths in the literature that has been adjusted upwards to account for 
presumed underreporting of deaths.  This adjustment is large, about 54%, and causes two 
problems.  First, this unprecedented adjustment complicates comparisons with other 
surveys since IFHS (2008a) is the only survey that makes such an adjustment.  The case 
that IFHS (2008a) makes for its adjustment is generic to all conflict surveys.  Therefore, 
if it is correct to adjust the IFHS upwards for these reasons then it is also correct to make 
                                                 
32 The same procedure is used for the Anbar adjustment but, unlike in Baghad, the 
violence levels imputed to the missing Anbar clusters turn out to be similar to the 
surveyed ones.  A very strange implication of this procedure is that, in effect, the IFHS 
ignores the all of its Baghdad and Anbar data.  The governorate-level estimates are 
completely determined by the IBC/IFHS ratio for the six high mortality governorates and 
the IBC numbers for Baghdad and Anbar.   
33 Conversely, if IBC’s coverage is worse in Baghdad than it is in the six high-mortality 
governorates than the IFHS adjustment would be too small. 
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a similar adjustment for the other surveys.  This means that when comparing estimates 
across surveys one should either compare unadjusted estimates with unadjusted estimates 
or else compare adjusted estimates with adjusted estimates.  Unfortunately, this point has 
often been overlooked in discussions of Iraq estimates and adjusted IFHS estimates are 
often compared to unadjusted estimates from other surveys.34   
The second problem is that the adjustment itself is ill-motivated and not grounded 
in any statistical procedure.  The sole motivation IFHS (2008a) offers for its upward 
adjustment is “household dissolution after the death of a household member.”  The idea 
seems to be that, for example, there is a death in a household “A” which then merges 
with a household “B” to form a new household which we will call “AB”.  A respondent 
representing household AB, but who was originally in household B, might then fail to 
report the death that occurred in household A before households A and B merged.  This 
is, indeed, a possible scenario.  However, it is also possible that after a death in household 
A the remaining members might split apart with some joining a household B and others 
joining a household C.35  In this case, the death from household A could get reported 
either by merged household AB or by merged household AC.  Thus, the original death 
from household A can easily get too much weight in the sample rather than too little 
weight as assumed in IHFS (2008a).  Therefore, the motivation that IHFS (2008a) gives 
for its upward adjustment actually cuts in opposite directions and it is unclear that 
household dissolution really is a source of downward bias even.  This, however, is only 
part of the problem with this adjustment.  If IFHS (2008a) wished to adjust for household 
dissolution it should have modeled the phenomenon and applied a statistical correction 
procedure rooted in data.  Instead, IFHS (2008a) simply scaled up its estimate by an 
arbitrarily chosen 54% (with arbitrary specified uncertainty around this scale-up factor 
added in as well).  This means that roughly 50,000 out of 151,000 violent deaths in the 





 This article identifies a number of factors to consider in evaluating conflict 
surveys, including sampling procedures, mechanisms for ensuring the integrity of the 
data collection process, the appropriateness of extrapolations and the setting of baselines 
in the case of excess death calculations (if these are to be done).  Published descriptions 
of methods are sometimes vague or ambiguous, but when they are relatively clear they 
often point towards significant weaknesses.  These include sampling biases, big 
extrapolations from relatively small surveyed populations to much larger affected 
                                                 
34 Note that, because of this confusion, in Table 1 I report both adjusted and unadjusted 
figures for the IFHS.  It would be correct to report only unadjusted figures.  However, 
doing this would confuse some readers who are used to seeing only adjusted figures for 
the IFHS. 
35 Note that the average household size in Iraq is 6.4 according to the IFHS so if one 
person dies there would be five survivors on average.  It is hard to absorb five people into 
a single household so it is plausible that many households would split into separate pieces 
if they dissolve. 
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populations, unclear incentives of interviewers or interviewees, supervision methods that 
may be inadequate to combat these incentives and inadequate acknowledgement of the 
uncertainties underlying estimates that are made.  Unfortunately, quality evaluations of 
conflict surveys are often hampered by researchers’ failures to disclose their methods.  
Inadequate disclosure of methods, whether through negligence or stonewalling, goes 
against scientific principles and the public trust, and should not be tolerated by the 
community. 
 Gross overestimates of war deaths in the DRC made by the IRC, and in Iraq made 
by the L2 and ORB surveys, have shaken confidence in the survey approach to measuring 
war deaths.  However, analysis of these studies shows that they all have clearly 
identifiable faults that point toward what went wrong.  This is good news.  If it were 
impossible to discern when an estimate is extremely far from the truth then the survey 
approach would become unviable.   
There have been some successes in the literature.  The Spiegel and Salama (2000) 
estimate and seems to have generated an important insight into the age distribution of war 
victims.  The Depoortere et al. (2004) study made plain the severity of the Darfur crisis 
without making inappropriate extrapolations.   
Far more research is needed on survey methodologies for measuring war deaths to 
illuminate their limits and potential.  Some knowledge needs to be developed mostly 
from scratch, such as the performance and validation of various sampling schemes for 
estimating violent deaths.  At the same time, some relevant knowledge, such as large 
literatures on survey quality (e.g. Biemer and Lyberg, 2003) and on doing surveys in 
developing countries (e.g., Asher, 2009), is currently sitting on the shelf largely 
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